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RECENT CASES
turn. Evidence secured by private citizens or officers of other
jurisdictions, is admissible regardless of the manner in which it is
obtained, unless they were acting under express orders from federal
officers on that occasion or unless they acted in accordance with a
general understanding with federal officers, or unless they intended
to act solely on behalf of the federal government, even if there was
no previous understanding, express or implied, that they should
do so.
MIARIoN A. MARQUIs.
RECENT CASES
CoNnrroNAL SALES-SIGNATURE OF VEiNDOR. A salesman for the vendor
secured an order for certain machinery. The order was made out on a
conditional sale contract form which provided that the contract was sub-
ject to the approval of the vendbr at its home office. The name of the
vendor corporation was printed beneath the signature of the salesman,
and appeared again at the end of the form accompanied by blanks for the
personal signature of the proper approving officer. No such signature was
ever entered, but the goods were delivered and the form filed within
ten days. In this action by the vendor to recover the goods from the
vendee's receiver after default in payments, held, that the sale was abso-
lute as to the receiver, there being no signature by the vendor as required
by Rem. Comp. Stat. sec. 3790. State ex rel. Yates American MachiLne Co.
v. Superior Court, 47 Wash. Dec. 244, 266 Pac. 134 (1928).
The rule of the case is not new in this state. Jennings v. Schwartz, 82
Wash. 209, 144 Pac. 39 (1914) Kennery v. Northwestern Junk Co., 108
Wash. 656, 185 Pac. 636, 190 Pac. 330 (1919) Rychen 'v. Tacoma Farmers'
Creamery, 127 Wash. 359, 220 Pac. 780 (1923) Seymour v. Landon, 128
Wash. 682, 224 Pac. 3 (1924). The decision rests solely on the doctrine of
stare decisis, and Justice Tolman concurring specially denounces it as
illogical in light of the Statute of Frauds cases and recommends that the
court unite in a reversal of the rule so often laid down.
It must be conceded that handwriting is not the. only valid form of
signature. Stamped, printed or typewritten names have been consistently
recognized as proper signatures. 36 Cyc. 448. It is necessary only that
the signer adopt such symbols as his signature. Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill.
424 (1864) Midkiff v. Johnson County Savtngs Bank, 144 S. W 705 (Tex.
1912).
In the principal case, there being nothing to indicate express adoption,
it must appear if at all by implication from the facts of delivery of the
goods and filing of the document. Delivery might be referable to an abso-
lute sale, but the filing would seem to be sufficiently conclusive evidence
of adoption of the printed name as a signature binding on the vendor.
Opposed to this there is only the suggestion arising from the blanks that
the instrument is to be completed in a certain way. In this respect the
Statute of Frauds cases and those involving wills and commercial paper
are distinguishable, but there seems no very good reason why the vendor
may not waive provisions inserted solely for its own benefit. The Wash-
ington cases cited proceed on the theory that policy demands a stricter
rule in conditional sales cases to protect third persons. However, it would
seem that an examination of the records would certainly apprise a third
person of sufficient facts as to the vendee's interest in the property.
Directly opposed to the doctrine of the principal case is In re Coving-
ton Lumber Co., 225 Fed. 444 (1914), decided in the local federal court
shortly prior to the first of the Washington cases. In the later case of In
re Frankel, 225 Fed. 129 (1915), the same court seems to explain its former
decision on the ground that the contract was signed by the salesman. This
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solution seems doubtful since the salesman neither had nor purported to
have authority to make a binding contract. These cases are of course not
controlling on the state court and neither has ever been cited in the lat-
ter's decisions.
It seems improbable that the court would go so far as to hold that a
printed signature, unaccompanied by blanks, is insufficient.
J. G. G.
INNKEEPERS-AsSAULT BY ONE GUEST ON ANOTHER-LIABILITY OF LAND-
LORD. The plaintiff, a hotel guest, was assaulted by another guest, for
which assault she brought an action against the hotel proprietor, to recover
damages. The defendant had knowledge that the plaintiff had been pre-
viously insulted and annoyed by this guest. Held: That the plaintiff is
entitled to recover from the hotel proprietor. Gurren v. Casperson, 47
Wash. Dec. 215, 265 Pac. 472 (1928)
This decision is undoubtedly correct in view of the facts of the case;
for it appears that the defendant had been informed by the plaintiff that
the guest had annoyed her- and further that she had demanded from the
clerk of the hotel protection from the acts of the wrongdoer. The general
rule is that the innkeeper must protect his guests while in the inn against
injury at the hands of third persons, whether they be guests or strangers,
where it is in the power of himself or his servants so to do. Curran v.
Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W 1124, 97 Am. St. Rep. 517, 60 L. R. A. 733
(1903) Rommel v. Schambacher 120 Pa. St. 579, 11 Atl. 779, 6 Am. St.
Rep. 732 (1888) 32 C. J. 562. As to the extent of the innkeeper's duty
the authorities are divided. Many cases indicate that he owes the same
high degree of care to his guest that a common carrier owes to its patrons.
Turlock v. Wille, 187 Fed. 956, 112 C. C. A. 1 (1911) Dalzell v. Dean Hotel
Go., 193 Mo. App. 379, 186 S. W 41 (1916). The other view is that the
innkeeper must use only ordinary care. Clancy v. Barker 131 Fed. 161,
66 C. C. A. 469, 69 L. R. A. 643 (1904) Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495,
48 S. W 809, 43 L. R. A. 185, 70 Am. St. Rep. 693 (1898) It would seem
that the latter of the above stated views is the more reasonable in view
of the fact that the apparent weight of authority is to the effect that an
innkeeper is under legal obligation to receive and entertain all unobjection
able persons who offer themselves as guests so long as he has accommo-
dations for them, and they pay or are willing to pay a reasonable consider-
ation therefor. Willis v. McMahon, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1891) Bowliu
v. Lyon, FG Ia. 536, 25 N. W 766, 1885) The innkeeper can only be expected
to use reasonable care in deciding which guests are objectionable. If they
do not appear to be objectionable, he must receive them. It is therefore
logical that the innkeeper should be required to use only reasonable care
in protecting a guest from other guests. The duty should not be an abso-
lute duty- but his liability should be made to depend upon whether or
not he was negligent.
Which of the two views the Washington court approves has not been
decided. It was not necessary to decide that point in the principal case,
for here the innkeeper did not use even reasonable care inasmuch as he
had knowledge that the guest had been previously annoyed. Our court has
under other circumstances recognized degrees of care in negligence cases.
Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 Pac. 27 (1926) In the principal case the
court cites the case of Chase v. Knabel, 46 Wash. 484, 90 Pac. 642 (1907)
but that case is not directly in point. It is therefore still uncertain as to
what view of the standard of care the Washington court will take in a
case in which a guest is injured by another guest. E. G.
SEARCH WARRANTS-RIGHT TO SEIZE ARTICLES NOT NA31ED THEREI. ~.
Police officers entered defendant's premises under a search warrant for
liquor. No liquor was found but one of the officers saw goods which he
recognized as having been stolen and he arrested the defendant for receiv-
ing stolen goods. Held, that the motion to suppress the evidence was
properly denied, for the reason that, being lawfully on the premises, the
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officers could take cognizance of, and seize, the evidence of crime before
them. State v. McKinde7, 48 Wash. Dec. 148, 268 Pac. 593 (1928).
This is the first Washington case where this point has arisen. The
court states that the federal cases are to the contrary, but it is believed
that they are distinguishable on their facts. The requirements that search
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized, make general
searches under them impossible and prevent the seizure of one thing under
a warrant describing another. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 48
Sup. Ct. 74, 72 L. ed. - (1927), where under a search warrant for liquor
a ledger was .seized. Papers and documents cannot be seized under a
search warrant for liquor United States v. Olmsted, 7 Fed (2nd) 760
(1925). While the language of these cases indicates a contrary view, they
deal with a totally different problem, namely, the seizure, under a search
warrant for other things, of books, papers and documents which are not
on their face contraband. The papers and documents of themselves are not
subject to seizure, and admittedly the right to search and seize under a
search warrant is limited to the things described therein. A warrant to
search for smuggled goods cannot be used to search for evidence of viola-
tion of the prohibition act. United States v. Moore, 4 Fed (2nd) 600
(1925). But this does not mean that if an officer in searching for things
under a warrant, sees contraband or articles being used in the commission
of a crime, he may not seize them. He does not do this by virtue of his
warrant but in performance of his general duty to prevent the commission
of crime. State v. Muetzel, 121 Ore. 561, 254 Pac. 1010 (1927) United
States v. Camaorta et al. (D. C.), 278 Fed. 388 (1922). Contra, People v.
Preuss, 225 Mich. 115, 195 N. W 684 (1923) holding that an officer execut-
ing a search warrant for stolen beans may not seize intoxicating liquors
found on the premises. The Michigan court cites only TIFFANY, C R. LAW
362, and RULING CASE LAW. "If the warrant directs the seizure of a certain
kind of property, a seizure of an entirely different kind, constitutes the
officer a trespasser." 24 R. C. L. 709. This statement is based on State v.
Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097, 87 A. S. R. 711 (1901), which merely held
that under a warrant for stolen goods, a letter could not be seized. This
is a different case. The letter, not being contraband on its face, if subject
to seizure, was only so by virtue of the warrant, and the warrant did not
include the letter. The contraband, however, is subject to seizure because
of its nature, and this right on the part of the officer is independent of
the search warrant, except that the latter gives him a lawful right to be
on the premises. It will be conceded that the officer can only make a
search for the things designated in his search warrant; but if in making
this search he incidentally sees contraband, there is no valid objection to
his seizing it. It might be difficult to show, as in the principal case, that
the officer was searching for liquor, and was not searching for stolen goods,
(merely happening upon them in the course of his search for liquor), but
that is a question of proof and does not militate against the principle
laid down. M. A. M.
BOOK REVIEWS
LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics, Vol. iv, 1922-23. By various authors. New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1928. pp. viii, 393.
As appears from the title page, this book is a series of seventeen lec-
tures delivered before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
in the winter of 1922-23 by thirteen lawyers, judges and law teachers from
New York City and elsewhere. The subjects vary greatly and also the
manner of treatment, ranging from reminiscences of practice, with hints
to young lawyers, through closely reasoned lectures on the history of the
law and the development of the theories on which it is based, to prophecies
as to its future development.
Through all the lectures runs the thought that while the law should be
stable and so far as possible certain, yet it is a living and growing science,
